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Abstract. Automated trust negotiation (ATN) is a promising approach to estab-
lishing trust between two entities without any prior knowledge of each other.
However, real-world authorization processes often involve online input from third
parties, which ATN does not support. In this paper, we introduce multiparty trust
negotiation (MTN) as a new approach to distributed authorization. We define
a Datalog-based policy language, Distributed Authorization and Release Con-
trol Logic (DARCL), to specify both authorization and release control policies.
DARCL suits the needs of MTN and can also serve as a powerful general-purpose
policy language for authorization. To orchestrate the negotiation process among
multiple parties without a centralized moderator, we propose the diffusion nego-
tiation protocol, a set of message-passing conventions that allows parties to carry
out a negotiation in a distributed fashion. Building on top of the diffusion negoti-
ation protocol, we propose two negotiation strategies to drive MTN with different
tradeoffs between privacy and negotiation speed. We also show that these strate-
gies are safe and complete.
1 Introduction
Conventional authorization systems are closed in the sense that all important properties
of a user are known in advance, before the user requests authorization. In open dis-
tributed systems like the Web, however, often strangers have to interact with one another
to receive or provide services. When two parties interact to reach an authorization de-
cision, automated trust negotiation (ATN) is an effective approach to establishing trust
without any prior knowledge of each other. Under ATN, each party has authorization
policies based on digital credentials to limit outsiders’ access to its sensitive resources.
When an outsider requests access to a sensitive resource, the ensuing trust negotiation
includes a sequence of bilateral credential disclosures. Less sensitive credentials are
disclosed first, to build up enough trust to disclose more sensitive credentials. The ne-
gotiation ends when the resource owner’s authorization policy for access is satisfied, it
becomes clear that trust will not be established, or either party breaks off the negoti-
ation. If trust is established, the resource requester is authorized to access the owner’s
resource.
⋆ This paper is an extended version of the paper “Distributed Authorization by Multiparty Trust
Negotiation” that will appear in the Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research
in Computer Security (ESORICS 2008).
Real world authorization decisions often involve more than two parties. For exam-
ple, when one submits an online application for purchase of automobile insurance, the
insurance company needs to evaluate the buyer’s driving record and credit scores to
reduce the risk of the sale. The authorization process can be decomposed into a num-
ber of two-party negotiations, i.e., one negotiation between the insurance company and
the buyer for the purchase, another between the insurance company and the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles (DMV) for the buyer’s driving record, and a third between the
insurance company and the credit bureau for the buyer’s credit scores. However, decom-
position is insufficient to reduce an automated multiparty authorization into standalone
two-party trust negotiations, because individual negotiations may depend on one an-
other, and therefore need to be interleaved in a certain order for the overall negotiation
to succeed. For example, the negotiation between the insurance company and the buyer
cannot finish until the insurance company gets the result from the negotiation between
the insurance company and the credit bureau for the credit report, which in turn requires
the insurance company to get the buyer’s authorization for a credit check. For such a
multiparty authorization, we need a policy language expressive enough to describe the
dependencies between the participating parties and their requests, and a systematic and
automated way to decompose the authorization into multiple two-party negotiations and
interleave them in an order that respects the dependencies. We also need a way to detect
cycles of dependencies and handle them appropriately at run time. Overall, we need a
new authorization paradigm, Multiparty Trust Negotiation (MTN), where a negotiation
can be automatically carried out among multiple parties in accordance with each party’s
authorization policies.
Copyright, privacy, and security considerations often lead users to restrict the flow
of sensitive information. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA) [1] requires hospitals to make a reasonable effort to disclose only
the minimum necessary health information to third parties for purposes such as diag-
nosis and payment. Inappropriate disclosures can cause privacy breaches and serious
damage such as identity theft. In such situations, a release control policy is used to
specify the conditions under which a piece of information can be disclosed (sent) to an-
other party. Release policies are related to authorization policies, which govern access
to arbitrary resources under a “pull” paradigm. For example, an authorization policy
decides whether Alice can access a highly classified database, while a release control
policy decides who will be told that Alice has such a privilege. Some policy languages
clearly distinguish between these two kinds of policies [2, 3], and put restrictions on
how they can be used together; e.g., one cannot base an authorization decision on a
release control condition. In the DARCL policy language proposed in this paper, autho-
rization and release control are naturally integrated: an authorization can be based on a
release condition, and vice versa. Further, DARCL allows the policy writer to specify
both the source and destination of each disclosure, so that an authorization decision can
be based not only on the content of received information, but also on its source. This
feature allows DARCL to specify useful policies that other languages cannot, and also
makes DARCL a suitable policy language for MTN. For example, DARCL makes it
easy to say that before Alice gives Bob access to a certain resource, Bob has to disclose
certain of his qualifications to Alice and a third party Carl has to vouch for Bob.
A trust negotiation protocol specifies high-level conventions for communication be-
tween negotiating parties, including a set of permissible message types. In the most
common form of two-party negotiation protocol [4–7], each party takes turns sending
messages until the negotiation succeeds or fails. It is harder to define a protocol that
works for more than two parties. If we allow one peer to assume the role as a nego-
tiation moderator, the moderator can organize the negotiation into multiple rounds. In
each round, a peer sends requests to others and replies to requests it receives in previous
rounds. The negotiation continues until at a certain round, the moderator declares the
success or failure of the negotiation. Unfortunately, the centralized control of the mod-
erator approach directly contradicts the autonomous nature of open distributed systems.
For example, we need to be able to allow negotiating parties to leave and rejoin the
negotiation on the fly, making the moderator’s job complex and hard to scale. Ideally,
an MTN protocol should be distributed and free of centralized control.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
1. We propose MTN as a new paradigm for establishing trust in open distributed sys-
tems, while leveraging the effectiveness of two-party ATN. We extend and redefine
concepts and theories developed for ATN, so that we can use them to establish trust
among multiple parties.
2. We define DARCL as the first distributed policy language that supports both autho-
rization and release control in a unified way. DARCL policies can take the source
and destination of each credential disclosure into consideration, allowing policy-
writers to specify finer-grained access control constraints than with existing lan-
guages [8–11].
3. We present a lightweight distributed protocol for MTN, whose decentralized nature
makes it well-suited for peer-to-peer environments.
4. We provide two MTN negotiation strategies that are safe and complete, with differ-
ent tradeoffs between privacy and negotiation speed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present related work. In
Section 3 we define the DARCL policy language and related concepts. In Section 4 we
define MTN protocols and strategies, and introduce the diffusion negotiation protocol.
We present an eager negotiation strategy in Section 5 and a more cautious strategy in
Section 6. We give conclusions and discuss future work in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Since Winsborough et al. first introduced automated trust negotiation [4], a growing
body of work has been done in this area. Yu et al. [5, 12, 13] differentiated negotiation
strategies from protocols, proposed ways to limit the disclosure of sensitive credentials,
and devised ways to allow each negotiating party to pick its own negotiation strategy
autonomously. We build on their work by extending their basic concepts such as disclo-
sure sequences and strategies to work in an environment with more than two parties.
There are prior efforts to apply ATN to establish trust specifically in P2P systems.
Ye et al. [14] proposed a collaborative ATN scheme that uses locally trusted third parties
(LLTPs) to solve circular policy dependencies during negotiation. One of our goals is
to be able to handle certain common types of circular dependencies without relying on
trusted third parties. Bertino et al. [15] proposed Trust-X as a comprehensive framework
for ATN in a P2P environment. Trust-X offers a number of innovative features, such as
trust tickets, to speed up the negotiation. Both of these projects support two-party trust
negotiation only.
The research in distributed credential discovery and proof construction is the closest
to our work. QCM [16] and its successor SD3 [10] are trust management systems that
can automatically and recursively contact a remote party to gather credentials during the
policy evaluation. Li et al. [17] designed a goal-directed credential chain discovery al-
gorithm for their RT family of role-based trust-management systems, which was further
enhanced to support parameterized roles and constraints [18]. Bauer et al. [19] designed
a lazy proof construction algorithm that places the burden of proof on the credential is-
suers; later they revised this algorithm to improve performance [20] through techniques
such as pre-computing delegation chains. Compared to these proof construction algo-
rithms, MTN better supports autonomy for each peer with respect to which message
to send, and more naturally fits environments where peers employ customized negoti-
ation strategies based on their own constraints such as privacy sensitivity and resource
availability, and only provide best-effort service. A second difference is that MTN bases
its authorizations on iterative asynchronous message exchange, instead of the recursive
RPC used in distributed proof construction approaches. This simplifies implementation
and lowers runtime costs for maintaining the complex state of recursive RPCs. The third
difference is that the end result of a proof construction algorithm is a proof of autho-
rization, encoded as a tree or list of rules, facts, and derivation rules, which the resource
owner has to verify. Parts of the proof may be repeatedly verified by different peers
while the proof is constructed. MTN, however, uses only signed facts in disclosures,
and eliminates the need for proof delivery and verification.
Like almost every authorization policy language from the research community,
DARCL is based on Datalog [10, 8, 21, 22, 7, 3]. Similar to the policy languages of
PeerTrust [6], Cassandra [11], and PeerAccess [3], DARCL can explicitly model the
origin, flow, and distribution of credentials, which is implicit in other languages; yet
only DARCL allows explicit specification of constraints on the source and destination
of each disclosure, which gives the policy-writer finer-grained control over credential
flow and makes DARCL a suitable policy language for MTN.
Multiparty negotiation has been a research topic in multi-agent systems and busi-
ness intelligence. CONCENSUS [23] uses multiparty negotiation for conflict resolution
in concurrent engineering design. Querou et al. [24] presented an iterative method for
generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multiparty negotiations. Both of them are based
on mathematical models for quantitative conflict resolution, while MTN is driven by
authorization policies specified in logical formulas.
3 The DARCL Policy Language
We model a distributed system as a finite set of peers, each possessing a finite knowl-
edge base, who communicate with each other by exchanging messages about their re-
sources and services. Following the popular trend in trust management [10, 8, 21, 22],
we propose a declarative policy language, DARCL, based on Datalog. The syntax of
DARCL is given in Figure 1. A peer’s authorization policy for access to a resource or
service consists of a set of DARCL rules specifying the conditions that must be satisfied
before the access to the service can be granted.
rule ::= disclosure ← disclosure ∧ · · · ∧ disclosure
disclosure ::= peer↑credential↓peer
credential ::= peer.credential name(term, . . . , term)
term ::= peer | value
peer ::= variable | peer name
value ::= variable | string
variable ::= x | y | . . .
peer name ::= Alice | Bob | . . .
credential name ::= string
Fig. 1. Syntax of DARCL
In DARCL, credentials are signed predicates, which can be used to represent at-
tributes of subjects and authorizations for access to resources and services. DARCL
abstracts away several properties of real-world credentials such as X.509 certificates,
retaining only those needed to reason about distributed authorization. In the creden-
tial University.isRegisteredStudent(Alice),University is the issuer who signs the
credential, Alice is the subject, and isRegisteredStudent is the credential name. A
credential can have more than one subject. In this paper, values of DARCL credential
names and peer names will have more than one letter, to distinguish them from variables
such as x and y; and peer names will not be used as string-valued terms. We can instan-
tiate a variable in a DARCL formula by replacing all its occurrences with a constant. If
a DARCL formula does not contain any variables, then it is ground.
We use peer0 ↑C ↓peer1 to denote a disclosure, the sending of a message from one
peer to another, where peer0 is the source and peer1 is the destination of the message,
and C is its content. The head of each DARCL rule contains a disclosure. A rule’s body
can be empty, in which case the head of the rule is a fact. Intuitively, Alice ↑ C0 ↓Bob
in a rule’s head means Alice authorizes the disclosure of C0 to Bob, and Bob ↑ C1 ↓
Alice in a rule’s body means Alice has received C1 from Bob. DARCL rules must also
satisfy three additional constraints, which simplify rule specification and prevent certain
nonsensical policies. Let S0 ↑ C0 ↓D0 ← S1 ↑ C1 ↓D1, . . . , Sn ↑ Cn ↓Dn be a rule in
Alice’s authorization policy.
1. For every i ∈ [0, n], either Si or Di must be Alice; when the rule’s body is not
empty, the source S0 of the disclosure in the rule’s head must be Alice. This is
because Alice can only base her authorization decisions on her local state, i.e., her
own policies plus the credentials that have been sent to her. What kind of creden-
tial another party Bob sends to Carl is beyond Alice’s knowledge; similarly, Alice
cannot force Bob to disclose a credential.
2. If the issuer of the credential C0 in the head is not Alice and the rule’s body is not
empty, then C0 must be one of the credentials Ci in the body, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In other
words, before Alice can disclose a credential signed by somebody else, she must
have received it.
3. Every variable in the rule body must also occur in the head. Under this constraint,
if the disclosure in the head of a rule is ground after variable instantiations, so are
the disclosures in the body of the rule. As enforced in our inference rules shown
later, at run time every disclosed credential will be ground.
When the source and destination of a disclosure are the same peer, e.g., Alice↑C ↓
Alice, we call it a singular-disclosure. We use the singular-disclosure Alice↑C↓Alice
to represent the fact that Alice possesses the credential C. If the issuer of C is not Alice,
Alice ↑ C ↓Alice means Alice has received C. If Alice is the issuer of C, then Alice ↑
C ↓ Alice means Alice is willing to sign or has signed C, depending on whether it is
in the head or body of the rule. For simplification, we abbreviate a singular-disclosure
Alice↑C↓Alice as just C. This simplification causes no confusion, because restriction
1 tells us that C in Alice’s knowledge base must stand for Alice ↑ C ↓ Alice, and not
Bob↑C ↓Bob. If a disclosure’s source and destination are different, we call it a remote
disclosure. If an authorization rule’s head is a remote disclosure, then it is a release
control rule. The collection of all a peer’s policies and credentials is its knowledge
base.
In practice, credentials are often stored with their issuers or their subjects [17, 25];
in such a case, the source of a disclosure can be constrained to be the credential’s issuer
or one of its subjects. Such constraints are easy to express in DARCL but not built
into the language, because we want to support additional scenarios, such as when the
distribution of credentials is outsourced to a third party.
3.1 Policy Examples
We use two examples to show how DARCL can be used to specify release control and
authorization policies.
Example 1 Consider the following set of rules in Alice’s knowledge base:
(1) Bob.trusts(Carrie) ← Bob↑Bob.trusts(Carrie)↓Alice
(2) Alice↑Bob.trusts(Carrie)↓Diana ← Bob.trusts(Carrie)
(3) Alice↑Bob.trusts(Carrie)↓x ← Bob↑Bob.trusts(Carrie)↓Alice ∧
Carrie↑Bob.trusts(Carrie)↓Alice
(4) Alice.trusts(x) ← Diana.trusts(x)
(5) Alice↑Alice.trusts(Diana)↓x ← Alice.trusts(x)
Rule (1) is trivial: it says that if Bob tells Alice that he trusts Carrie, Alice knows that
he trusts Carrie. Rule (2) says that if Alice knows that Bob trusts Carrie, Alice will
tell Diana about it. Rule (3) says that if both Bob and Carrie tell Alice that Bob trusts
Carrie, Alice will tell everybody about it; Alice’s intuition is that since both Bob and
Carrie are open with her about it, they probably do not treat it as a secret. Rule (4) says
that Alice will trust anyone that she knows that Diana trusts. Rule (5) says that Alice
will tell everyone she trusts about the fact that she trusts Diana. The difference between
a singular-disclosure d = Alice.trusts(Diana) and a regular disclosure Alice ↑ d ↓
Eddie is clear: the former states that Alice trusts Diana, while the latter states to whom
Alice discloses that fact. Note that if we restrict the rules to use singular-disclosures
only, DARCL shrinks to a variant of existing Datalog-based authorization languages,
such as those used in [8–10]. These languages deal with authorization but not release
control, thus cannot specify rules like (3).
Example 2 Suppose Alice, a Canadian national, would like to apply for a digital Mexi-
can visa so that she can enter Mexico as a tourist. For security considerations, the Mex-
ican government has a new policy that requires its visa department, Embassy of Mexico
(EM), not to issue a visa for any Canadian national unless the applicant presents a valid
Canadian passport and passes the background check of Mexico’s security agency, Di-
reccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS). To respect privacy, DFS will not release Alice’s
background check result to EM unless DFS gets Alice’s permission to do so first. For
convenience and security considerations, DFS, as a security agency, deals directly with
EM, but not directly with any individual; therefore, any communication between Al-
ice and the DFS has to go through EM. Alice is willing to give EM what it requests,
provided that she can verify that EM has a digital certificate signed by the Mexican
government (MG) to show that EM really is the official Mexican embassy. EM, on the
other hand, is willing to show its certificate signed by MG to anyone. In DARCL, these
policies are as follows:
EM:
EM ↑EM.visa(x)↓x ← x↑Canada .passport(x)↓EM ∧
x↑x.OkToRelease(DFS , EM)↓EM ∧ DFS ↑DFS .clear(x)↓EM
EM ↑x.OkToRelease(DFS , EM)↓DFS ← x↑x.OkToRelease(DFS , EM)↓EM
EM ↑MG.officialEmbassy(EM)↓x
DFS:
DFS ↑DFS .clear(x)↓EM ← EM ↑x.okToRelease(DFS , EM)↓DFS ∧
DFS .clear(x)
Alice:
Alice↑Alice.okToRelease(DFS, x)↓x ← x↑MG.officialEmbassy(x)↓Alice
Alice↑Canada .passport(Alice)↓x ← x↑MG.officialEmbassy (x)↓Alice ∧
Canada .passport(Alice)
We will revisit these examples in subsequent sections.
3.2 Inference Rules
Our next step is to show how authorization decisions can be made based on DARCL
policies. Sometimes a peer can make an authorization decision based on only its local
authorization policies. Other times, an authorization decision is collectively based on
the peer’s local policies and the information it receives from other peers. Accordingly,
DARCL has two types of inference rules, local and global. From a logical perspective,
the local inference rules are used to derive new facts or rules within a peer’s knowledge
base, while the global inference rules, together with the local inference rules, can be
used to derive new facts based on more than one peer’s knowledge base.
Local Inference Rules A peer A can use the following local derivation rules.
– Instantiation. From a rule r in A’s knowledge base, derive an instance of r by
replacing all occurrences of the same variable in r with another variable or literal.
– Knowledge. From B ↑d↓A, derive A↑d↓A.
– Modus ponens. From a rule d0 ← d1 ∧ · · · ∧ dn and facts di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n in A’s
knowledge base, derive d0.
Global Inference Rule
– From A↑d↓B in A’s knowledge base, where d is ground, derive A↑d↓B in B’s
knowledge base.
Returning to Example 1, let us see how we can use the inference rules to decide
whether Alice can tell Edward that she trusts Diana. Suppose Diana trusts Edward and
has told Alice about it; i.e., Alice’s knowledge base hasDiana↑Diana.trusts(Edward)↓
Alice. By the knowledge rule, we deriveDiana.trusts(Edward). Applying instantia-
tion and modus ponens on rule (4), we get Alice.trusts(Edward). Repeating the same
derivations on rule (5), we get Alice↑Alice.trusts(Diana)↓Edward; i.e., Alice can
tell Edward that she trusts Diana.
If we apply both the local and global inference rules to all policies in everyone’s
knowledge bases, we can reason about every possible authorization that any peer can
ever make. Continuing with Example 1, if we apply the global inference rule on the
fact Alice ↑ Alice.trusts(Diana) ↓ Edward in Alice’s knowledge base, we derive
Alice↑Alice.trusts(Diana)↓Edward in Edward’s knowledge base.
Although it is theoretically interesting to reason about authorizations globally, in
practice there is no omniscient authority to reason about everyone’s policies in an open
distributed system. Before Alice approves an authorization request from Bob, she may
request credentials from Bob and other peers, which can trigger more rounds of creden-
tial requests and disclosures. MTN is such a process, where peers conduct multilateral
message exchanges to collectively make an authorization decision without losing each
peer’s autonomy; i.e., at any moment, each peer’s authorization decisions are still based
on its current local policies.
3.3 Disclosure Sequences
We say a ground disclosure d = Alice ↑ C ↓Bob is unlocked if d is already in Alice’s
knowledge base, or d can be derived in Alice’s knowledge base using the local inference
rules; otherwise, d is locked. Suppose d is locked, and will be unlocked if Alice receives
disclosures d1, . . . , dn from other peers; we say d is unlocked by d1, . . . , dn. We say a
ground disclosure e is a relevant disclosure for d if e derives e by the knowledge rule,
or there exists an instantiation r′ of rule r that has d as its head and e is a disclosure in
the body of r′. If e is a relevant disclosure for d, then every relevant disclosure for e is
also a relevant disclosure for d.
A ground disclosure is safe if it is unlocked at the time it takes place. For example,
Alice can safely disclose C to Bob if Alice↑C ↓Bob is unlocked in Alice’s knowledge
base. We define a disclosure sequenceSeq as [d1, . . . , dn], where each di = Si ↑Ci ↓Di
is a remote disclosure representing Si disclosing Ci to Di, and each di+1 takes place
after di. Seq is a safe disclosure sequence for dn (or simply safe) if each di is safe at
the time it takes place. More specifically, every di must either be unlocked before the
first disclosure in S takes place, or be unlocked once di−1 has taken place. When Seq
is safe, [d1, . . . , di] is a safe disclosure sequence for di, which gives us the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. If [d1, . . . , dn] is a safe disclosure sequence, then there is a safe disclo-
sure sequence for di with at most i disclosures, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The existence of a safe disclosure sequence S for d = Bob ↑ C ↓Alice means that
if the disclosures take place in the order given in S, resource owner Bob can eventu-
ally safely grant Alice access to resource C, without violating any peer’s authoriza-
tion policy. Suppose that in Example 2, DFS clears Alice’s background by signing
DFS .clear(Alice); then there is the following safe disclosure sequence that leads to
EM sending a signed visa to Alice.
[ EM ↑MG.officialEmbassy(EM)↓Alice, Alice↑Canada.passport(Alice)↓EM ,
Alice↑Alice.okToRelease(DFS, EM)↓EM , EM ↑Alice.okToRelease(DFS, EM)↓DFS ,
DFS ↑DFS .clear(Alice)↓EM , EM ↑EM.visa(Alice)↓Alice ]
The goal of MTN is to find such a safe disclosure sequence.
3.4 Semantics
We provide a local and global semantics for DARCL based on the least Herbrand
model. Suppose a distributed system has a finite set N of peers, where each peer A
has policy (knowledge base) PA. The current state of the system is captured by a dis-
tributed set of DARCL rules P = {(A,PA) | A ∈ N}, which we also call a system
configuration. We define an interpretation for P as I = {(A, IA) | A ∈ N}, where
IA is a set of ground disclosures. The local semantics decides what a peer can disclose
based on its local rules and facts, whereas the global semantics decides what a peer can
eventually disclose within the system.
We define the local semantics for P as follows.
1. A ground singular disclosure d = A↑δ↓A is locally true in I at A iff d ∈ IA.
2. A ground remote disclosure d = B ↑ δ ↓C is locally true in I at A iff {d,A ↑ δ ↓
A} ⊆ IA, and A equals B or C.
3. A ground rule of the form d0 ← d1 ∧ · · · ∧ dn is locally true in I at A iff either d0
is locally true in I at A, or there exist di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that di is not locally true
in I at A.
4. A non-ground rule or disclosure is locally true in I at A iff each of its ground
instances is locally true in I at A.
5. A system configuration P is locally true in I iff for every A ∈ N , and every rule r
in PA, r is locally true in I at A. In this case, we call I a local model for P .
Define the intersection of two interpretations I and I ′ as
I ∩ I ′ = {(A, IA ∩ I
′
A) | A ∈ N}
Let P be the intersection of all P’s local models. P is still a local model for P ; we call
P the canonical local model for P .
Similarly, we define the global semantics for P .
1. A ground singular disclosure d = A↑δ↓A is globally true in I at A iff d ∈ IA.
2. A ground remote disclosure d = B ↑ δ ↓C is globally true in I at A iff {d,B ↑ δ ↓
B} ⊆ IB , {d,A↑δ↓A} ⊆ IC , and A equals B or C.
3. A ground rule of the form d0 ← d1 ∧ · · · ∧ dn is globally true in I at A iff either
d0 is globally true in I at A, or di is not globally true in I at A for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
4. A non-ground rule or disclosure is globally true in I at A iff each of its ground
instances is globally true in I at A.
5. A system configuration P is globally true in I iff for every A ∈ N , and every rule
r in PA, r is globally true in I at A. In this case, we call I a global model for P .
Let P be the intersection of all P’s global models. P is a global model for P ; we call
P the canonical global model for P .
The local and global inference rules are sound with respect to their corresponding
semantics, and they are complete for derivations of ground facts, which is sufficient for
serving the purpose of MTN-based authorization.
Theorem 1. Let P be the current system configuration, and let d be a ground disclo-
sure.
– d is unlocked at peer A iff d is locally true in P at A.
– If d is a remote disclosure with source A, then there is a safe disclosure sequence
for d iff d is globally true in P at A.
Proof Sketch. We translate every disclosure S ↑ A.p(t1, . . . , tn) ↓ D into a regular
Datalog atom p(A,S,D, t1, . . . , tn). We then argue soundness by stepping through the
derivation rules one by one and showing that every derived rule/fact is in fact true ac-
cording to the semantics. We prove local completeness for derivations of ground dis-
closures by using the same line of argument employed to show the completeness of the
least Herbrand model for Datalog. It is more challenging to show global completeness
for ground disclosures, i.e., that whenever the semantics tells us that a ground disclosure
could be made, it can also be generated using inference rules. For this purpose, we must
consider all sequences of system configurations P ,P1,P2, . . . that result from sending
a single message from one peer to another and thereby adding one new disclosure to the
recipient’s knowledge base. Then we define the concept of a fair sequence of system
configurations, in which every local piece of information that a peer Alice can divulge
to a peer Bob eventually is divulged. We say that a system configuration is an upper
bound for a fair sequence if it is a superset of every configuration in the sequence. We
define the fixpoint of a fair sequence of configurations to be the union of all the upper
bounds for that sequence. Then we show that if we let E be the intersection of all the
fixpoints for all fair sequences for P , every ground disclosure d that is true in I at a peer
PARTICIPATEINMTN () {
while willing to participate do
if the incoming message queue is empty then
Wait a short period of time for new messages
if there is a new message in the incoming message queue then
Choose such a message m and remove it from the queue
Record m’s receipt time as the current time
ProcessMessage(m)
}
/* message handler */
PROCESSMESSAGE (m) {
/* Mreceived and Msent store received and sent messages respectively */
Mreceived = Mreceived ∪ {m}
If m is a disclosure, add m to the local knowledge base L
Apply the local negotiation strategy with parameters Mreceived, Msent, and L,
which returns a list of messages M
/* send the messages to their intended recipients */
if M is not empty then
for every message k in M do
Send k to its specified recipient
Record k’s sending time as the current time
Msent = Msent ∪ {k}
}
Fig. 2. The Diffusion Negotiation Protocol
A is present in A’s knowledge base in E. Finally, we point out that the fairness property
lets us extract a safe disclosure sequence for d. This disclosure sequence corresponds to
a particular finite sequence of system configurations, representing the global inferences
that one must carry out to derive d.
4 MTN Protocols and Strategies
In our authorization framework, peers negotiate with each other by sending mes-
sages, following the conventions specified by a negotiation protocol. Protocols can be
specified at different levels. At the lowest level, a protocol defines how messages can be
encoded and transferred through a particular medium. For our purpose of trust negotia-
tion research, we are primarily concerned with high-level message-passing conventions
regarding how to start a negotiation, when it is a particular peer’s turn to send a message,
what the formats of the messages are, and how to tell whether a negotiation succeeds or
fails. On top of a common negotiation protocol, a peer employs a negotiation strategy,
which is its plan of action to achieve a certain goal, e.g., reaching a successful con-
clusion to the negotiation as soon as possible. More specifically, a negotiation strategy
decides the content of each message, i.e., what messages to send back in reply to a
received message.
We propose a completely distributed MTN protocol that allows the negotiation
to proceed without any centralized control. Party A starts a negotiation by sending a
ground request r = ?B ↑ R ↓ A to another party B. We call A the originator and r
the originating request of the MTN. After the originating request is sent, no peer sends
any message as part of this negotiation, unless it first receives a message. Once a party
receives a message, it sends a finite number (possibly zero) of messages to other par-
ties, and then remains “silent” until it receives another message. This protocol for MTN
falls into the general class of protocols that Dijkstra and Scholten describe as diffusing
computation [26], provided that the number of messages that each party sends within a
single negotiation is finite, which always has to be true for the negotiation to be useful.
We therefore call this MTN protocol the diffusion protocol. An MTN succeeds when the
requested disclosure in the originating request is actually made (e.g., when Bob actu-
ally grants Alice access to his resource). An MTN terminates when none of the parties
sends or receives any more messages.
We give the pseudocode for the diffusion protocol in Figure 2. A peer willing to
participate in an MTN is either waiting for messages from other peers, or processing
received messages. Incoming messages are put in a queue until processed. The choice
of which queued message to process next is a strategic decision; for the purpose of this
paper, any choice is satisfactory (FIFO, LIFO, random, giving higher priority to certain
peers or message types, etc.).
Each incoming message is stamped with a receipt time when it is processed, and
each outgoing message is stamped with a sending time. Both timestamps represent the
party’s local time; in other words, we do not assume a globally consistent time clock.
We do assume that if a peer Alice sends (respectively, processes) message 1 and later
sends (resp. processes) message 2, then Alice’s timestamp for message 1 is earlier than
her timestamp for message 2. Messages already processed or being processed are stored
in the set Mreceived, while those already sent to others are stored in the set Msent. A
message can be a disclosure d, a request for d (denoted ?d), a denial to disclose d
(denoted as !d), or any other type of message that is specific to the strategy that the
participating parties adopt. To process a new message m, the local party Pthis adds
m to Mreceived, and calls its local negotiation strategy with Mreceived, Msent, and its
local authorization rules L. The negotiation strategy returns a list of messages, which
P subsequently sends to the appropriate recipients. The diffusion protocol is strategy-
neutral, meaning that different MTNs can use different strategies while following the
same protocol.
We make the following assumptions and simplifications. For clarity, Figure 2 is
written as though only one negotiation takes place at a time. To support multiple concur-
rent negotiations, the originating request should include a new globally unique session
ID, and the protocol should associate that session ID with each message sent as part
of the negotiation. Similarly, the message handler PROCESSMESSAGE and the negotia-
tion strategies given in subsequent sections should all be parameterized with the session
ID so that they deal each negotiation separately. While we do not explicitly deal with
lost or delayed messages, in practice they can be detected through predefined timeouts
and handled accordingly. We require that peers communicate through secured channels,
and all the credentials exchanged are digitally signed, thus verifiable, nonforgeable and
nonrepudiable.
5 Eager Strategies
A party can adopt an eager strategy if it is eager to bring the negotiation to a successful
conclusion as soon as possible. To speed up the negotiation, an eager strategy aggres-
sively requests relevant remote disclosures and is willing to make requested disclosures
as soon as they become unlocked. The first eager strategy that we present is a relatively
unsophisticated version, which we call the basic eager strategy (BES).
5.1 Basic Eager Strategy
Figure 3 gives the BES strategy. For a participating peer Pthis, the goal is to calculate
Dnew, the set of unlocked disclosures that are requested by other parties, but not dis-
closed yet; and Qnew, the set of disclosures that Pthis would like to request from other
parties. The current message m has the latest timestamp in Mreceived. If m is a disclo-
sure d, we calculate Dunlocked, the set of disclosures that are unlocked by d and other
previously received disclosures. Since there is no need to disclose unrequested creden-
tials or make the same disclosure to the same peer twice, we intersect Dunlocked and
the disclosures Qreceived that other parties requested from Pthis, then subtract Dsent,
which contains all disclosures already sent, and finally get Dnew. If m happens to be
a request for disclosure d that is unlocked already, we can simply set Dnew to be {d}.
If, however, d is still locked, we calculate the set Drelevant of all relevant remote dis-
closures for d, then subtract all disclosures Pthis received and all disclosures Pthis
requested from others, which gives us Qnew, the new disclosures that Pthis will request
from others in order to unlock d. Adding the disclosures in Dnew and the requests for
the disclosures in Qnew, we get the messages that Pthis will send as a response to m.
We are particularly interested in two basic properties of a strategy: safety and com-
pleteness. A strategy is safe if every disclosure in the negotiation is safe. Assume that
every peer involved in the negotiation follows the same strategy Θ and is willing to par-
ticipate, and there is no loss of messages. Then strategy Θ is complete if the negotiation
succeeds whenever there is a safe disclosure sequence for the originating request.
Theorem 2. The BES strategy is both safe and complete.
Proof BES creates new disclosures in only two places, line 14 and 17. In both cases,
the newly added disclosures are unlocked already, which proves the strategy’s safety.
We use mathematical induction on the length of the safe disclosure sequence for the
originating request to prove its completeness. Let ?d =?Alice↑C ↓Bob be the originat-
ing request in the negotiation, and S be a safe disclosure sequence for d. If the length
of S is 1, d is unlocked already at the beginning of the negotiation. Thus when Al-
ice processes the request ?d, the condition in line 16 is satisfied and d is added to the
set of items to be disclosed, which means that the negotiation is successful. Suppose
the negotiation is successful when the length of S is k. Consider the case when S’s
length is k + 1. If d is unlocked, the negotiation is trivially successful as shown before.
Suppose that d is unlocked by {d1, d2, . . . , dm} and each di, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, precedes d
in S. Then Alice has a rule in her knowledge base that instantiates to the ground rule
d ← d1 ∧ · · · ∧ dm ∧ dm+1 ∧ · · · ∧ dm+m′ , where dm+1, . . . , dm+m′ can already be
1. BASICEAGERSTRATEGY (Mreceived, Msent, L) {
2. Let Pthis be the current peer
3. m = the latest message in Mreceived
4. Qsent = set of disclosures Pthis requested from others
5. Qreceived = set of disclosures others requested from Pthis
6. Qnew = ∅
7. Dsent = set of disclosures Pthis sent to others
8. Dreceived = set of disclosures Pthis received from others
9. Dnew = ∅
10.
11. if m is a disclosure d then
12. /* Calculate new disclosures Dnew that Pthis will send to other parties */
13. Dunlocked = all disclosures unlocked by d and other disclosures in Dreceived
14. Dnew = Dunlocked ∩ Qreceived − Dsent
15. else if m is a request for disclosure d then
16. if d is already unlocked then
17. Dnew={d}
18. else
19. /* Calculate new disclosures Qnew that Pthis will request from others */
20. Drelevant = all relevant remote disclosures for d
21. Qnew = Drelevant − Dreceived − Qsent
22.
23. Return the list of messages composed of disclosures in Dnew and requests for
disclosures in Qnew
24. }
Fig. 3. The Basic Eager Strategy
derived from Alice’s local knowledge base. Alice will request each di from the appro-
priate party, which can be viewed as a sub-negotiation with originating request ?di. By
Theorem 1, di has a safe disclosure sequence whose length is at most k, which implies
that the sub-negotiation for di will succeed. Thus Alice will receive all di, and d sub-
sequently gets unlocked and disclosed to Bob. By induction, we conclude that the BES
strategy is complete.
5.2 Full Eager Strategy
BES guarantees every negotiation to succeed if the negotiation has a safe disclosure
sequence. If, however, there is no safe disclosure sequence, the original requester will
not hear anything back about its originating request, which also means that it is unable to
decide when to declare that the negotiation has failed. Presumably, we could solve this
issue by requiring the participating parties to respond with an explicit denial message
when the requested disclosure cannot be made. For example, if Alice finds no rule that
can be used to unlock the originating request she receives, she can just explicitly deny
this request. The decision to deny a request, nonetheless, is not always easy to make.
Suppose Alice’s decision on whether to disclose d1 depends on whether Bob discloses
d2, Bob’s decision on d2 depends on whether Carl discloses d3, and Carl’s decision on
d3 depends on whether Alice discloses d1. With such a circular dependency, if nobody
makes a decision until he or she hears from the dependent party, the negotiation gets
1. FULLEAGERSTRATEGY (Mreceived, Msent, L) {
2. Let Pthis be the current peer
3. m = the latest message in Mreceived
4. M1 = ∅
5. /* A data message is a disclosure or a disclosure request */
6. if m is a data message then
7. M1 = BasicEagerStrategy(Mreceived, Msent, L)
8. else
9. m must be an ACK message &e, for some e ∈ Msent. Mark e as ACKed.
10.
11. M2 = ∅
12. T = the set of all data messages that Pthis received and has not ACKed yet.
13. if all data messages that Pthis sent have been ACKed or Pthis is the originator
then
14. add to M2 an ACK message for every message in T
15. else
16. add to M2 an ACK message for every message in T , except the one with the
earliest receipt time
17.
18. Return M1 ∪ M2
19. }
Fig. 4. The Full Eager Strategy
deadlocked. When a deadlock happens and no one sends or receives any messages,
the subnegotiation that spawned the deadlock cycle has effectively terminated. In the
absence of deadlock, an MTN under the BES strategy also always terminates. This is
because the set of peers is finite and BES does not repeat messages: each request or
disclosure is sent from one party to another at most once and there are only finitely
many potential relevant queries and disclosures. Given the completeness of BES, the
original requester can declare failure of the negotiation if the originating request has not
been granted when the negotiation terminates. So the problem of detecting the failure
of an MTN under BES can be reduced to the detection of the termination of the MTN.
Dijkstra and Scholten give a signaling scheme [26] that can detect the termination
of a diffusion computation. Their signaling scheme tracks the balance of messages and
signals on each edge between two nodes and centers around a number of invariants on
these balances. By enhancing and simplifying their signaling scheme to match the char-
acteristics of MTN, we provide a simple acknowledgment (ACK) scheme that can be
superimposed on top of BES and detect the termination of an MTN. This results in an
extension of BES, which we call the Full Eager Strategy (FES). We use two types of
messages in FES, data messages and ACK messages. A data message is either a dis-
closure or a disclosure request, as used in BES. An ACK message (&m) acknowledges
(abbreviated as ACKs) a data message m. Each data message gets ACKed exactly once
in FES. A peer’s state is disengaged if all the data messages it sent have been ACKed
and it has ACKed all the data messages it received; otherwise, its state is engaged.
Figure 4 gives the FES strategy. For a newly received message m, we first check its
type. If m is a data message, we apply the BES strategy, and get a set of messages M1
that the current peer Pthis will send out. On the other hand, if m is an ACK message for
a data message e that Pthis sent out earlier, we mark e as ACKed. We then calculate the
set of data messages that Pthis is going to ACK. If every data message that Pthis sent
out has been ACKed or Pthis is the originator of the MTN, we ACK all messages in T ,
the set of data messages received by Pthis and not ACKed yet. If not all data messages
Pthis sent have been ACKed, Pthis ACKs all in T , except the one that has the earliest
receipt timestamp.
Theorem 3. The FES strategy is both safe and complete.
Proof Since the ACK scheme in FES is superimposed on BES, all data messages are
still sent and processed the same way as in BES, which means BES’s safety and com-
pleteness are not affected. Therefore FES is also safe and complete.
Theorem 4. In every MTN under FES, the originator’s state will eventually become
disengaged. At that point, the negotiation has terminated.
Proof Suppose when the originator’s state becomes disengaged, Alice’s state is still
engaged. Then either Alice has not ACKed a data message that she received, or has
not received an ACK for a data message mo that she sent. In the latter case, since
Alice is not the originator, she must have sent mo as a response to some data message
mi that she received. As mo is still not ACKed, either mi is not ACKed yet, or there
exists a message that Alice received earlier than mi and has not ACKed. In any case,
Alice cannot have ACKed all the data messages she received. Let mA be the earliest
data message that Alice received and has not been ACKed yet. Suppose mA comes
from Bob. Since mA is not ACKed and the originator is disengaged, Bob cannot be
the originator. Following the same analysis for Alice, we infer that Bob cannot have
ACKed all the message that he received. Let mB be the earliest data message that he
received and has not been ACKed yet. Continue on, and we get a chain of messages,
mA, mB , mC , . . .. As there are only a finite number of parties in the MTN, the chain
has to form a cycle at some point. Without loss of generality, assume the chain starts
a cycle at Zachary, where Zachary has a data message mZ that comes from Bob, and
mZ is the earliest data message that Zachary has not yet ACKed. Assume Bob sent
mA to Alice as a response to a data message mj Bob received. Since mA has not been
ACKed, either Bob has not ACKedmj or Bob has another un-ACKed message received
earlier than mj . Since mB is the earliest un-ACKed data message that Bob received,
we have that Bob sent mA to Alice after Carl sent mB to Bob. Denote this situation
as mA ≻ mB . Continuing on, we have mB ≻ mC , mC ≻ mD, . . . , mZ ≻ mB ,
which exhibits a contradiction. So Alice’s state has to be disengaged. We further get
that all parties are disengaged. Since all the data messages have been ACK’ed, no one
can send (or receive) any ACK message unless they receive (or send, resp.) another data
message. No one can receive another data message unless somebody sends a new data
message. Yet if we examine the FES strategy, we find that a peer cannot send a message
unless its current state is engaged. Thus we conclude that no one can send or receive
any message, i.e., the MTN has terminated.
We now show that the MTN is guaranteed to terminate. If the MTN never termi-
nates, there has to be an infinite sequence of messages that can be sent between the
parties. Similar to BES, however, the FES strategy does not repeat messages: each data
message is sent from one party to another at most once, each data message is ACKed
at most once, and there are only finitely many different relevant data messages, which
prevents an infinite message sequence. So the MTN always terminates.
Now we show that when the negotiation terminates, the originator is in the dis-
engaged state. Suppose Alice is the originator and her state is still engaged after the
termination. Then the last time Alice sent or received a message, there must have been
at least one data message that Alice sent and that has not been ACKed; otherwise, Al-
ice would have become disengaged. Let mA be such a data message, and assume this
message was sent to Bob. Following the same analysis for Alice, we get the existence
of an un-ACKed message mB , sent by Bob. Continuing on, we get a sequence of mes-
sages mA, mB , mC , . . .. Since there are only finitely many parties, the sequence has
to form a cycle at some point, i.e., there exists mZ in the sequence, such that mZ is
an un-ACKed data message and was sent to x, with mx occurring before mZ in the
sequence. Alice, as the originator, has ACKed all the data messages she received; so x
cannot be Alice. Bob has ACKed all the message he received, except mA; so x cannot
be Bob. Continuing on, we find that x cannot be anyone such that mx occurs before
mZ in the sequence, which contradicts the assumption that the sequence forms a cycle
at mZ . Thus Alice has to be in the disengaged state when the MTN terminates.
6 Cautious Strategy
As the eager strategies aggressively explore possible routes to speed up the negotiation
by requesting all relevant remote disclosures at the same time, some pending requests
become unnecessary and irrelevant when their alternatives are successfully explored.
Consequently, the participating parties may send more messages to one another than
strictly necessary. For example, when all parties are willing to participate, FES will
eventually find all proofs that the originating request holds, rather than stopping and
canceling all pending requests once it finds the first successful proof. Since credentials
can contain sensitive and valuable information, some parties will place a high priority
on their privacy and would prefer to disclose fewer of their credentials, even at the cost
of increased negotiation time.
To meet these needs, we propose the cautious strategy, which aims to reduce creden-
tial disclosures by making fewer requests in the first place. Under the cautious strategy,
when Alice receives a request for a disclosure d that is still locked, she selects only
one relevant remote disclosure to request from another party, instead of concurrently
requesting all relevant remote disclosures that are still missing in her knowledge base.
If the selected disclosure request gets denied, she requests another relevant remote dis-
closure, and repeats the process until she runs out of options; at that point she explicitly
denies the request for d. Since the MTN is distributed among multiple parties, Alice
may eventually have sent multiple unanswered requests, and special care must be taken
to avoid circular dependencies and prevent deadlock.
Figure 5 describes the cautious strategy. We first examine the type of the message
m newly received by the current peer Pthis. If m is a request for disclosure d, we record
this information in e and save e for later reference. If m is a disclosure d or a denial
for disclosure !d, we examine Pthis’s received messages to find the disclosure e that
1. CAUTIOUSSTRATEGY (Mreceived, Msent, L) {
2. Let Pthis be the current peer
3. m = the latest message in Mreceived
4.
5. if m is a request for a disclosure d then
6. e = d
7. else
8. m must be a disclosure d or a denial !d.
9. Let ?e be the latest request in Mreceived that has not been denied or disclosed,
and for which d is relevant.
10. if no such ?e exists then
11. /* The originating request of the negotiation must be for d. If m is a dis-
closure, the MTN has succeeded; otherwise, m is a denial message, and
the MTN has failed. */
12. Return ∅
13. if e is already unlocked then
14. Return {e}
15. Let S be the set containing all remote disclosures f such that (1) f is relevant to
e, (2) f has not been received by Pthis, (3) if Pthis has requested f , that request
has been denied; and (4) Pthis has not requested f since it received ?e
16. if S is empty then
17. /* There are no more disclosures that Pthis can request to unlock e */
18. Return { !e }
19. Pick one disclosure g from S
20. Return {?g}
21. }
Fig. 5. The Cautious Strategy
Pthis was trying to unlock at the time that it requested d. If no such e exists, d must be
the disclosure in the originating request; in this case, since the originating request has
been answered, we can tell whether the negotiation has succeeded or failed. In other
cases, we need to continue to process the request for disclosure e. If e is unlocked
already, we add it to the return message so that it gets subsequently disclosed. If e is
still locked, we examine e’s relevant remote disclosures to find those that Pthis can
potentially request. Let q be the latest request for e in Pthis’s received messages, and f
be any of e’s relevant remote disclosures that are not present in Pthis’s knowledge base.
If we requested f already and have not received a response to that request, we should
not request f again, as otherwise a cyclic dependency is established. If f was requested
after q’s receipt time and denied already, there is no need to repeat the request for f ,
because the request for f will be denied again. If there are no more relevant remote
disclosures to request, we have to deny the request for e.
Line 19 of the cautious strategy involves a strategic decision. Based on Alice’s past
experience, if she thinks that a received request e is likely to be denied eventually, she
can choose to request the relevant remote disclosures for e that are most likely to be
denied, to minimize the expected amount of effort that she must expend before she can
deny e. If she expects that e will not be denied and she wants to grow her knowledge
base, she might prefer to send as many requests as possible (to gather as much new
information as possible) before concluding that e holds. Under this approach, she needs
to delay making new requests that are likely to unlock e, until she has made as many
other relevant requests as possible.
Theorem 5. The cautious strategy is both safe and complete. Further, every negotia-
tion under the cautious strategy eventually terminates, with the original request either
denied or disclosed (granted).
Proof The cautious strategy makes the decision to authorize a disclosure only at line 5,
under the condition that the disclosure is already unlocked. This guarantees safety.
To show completeness, we induct on the length of the safe disclosure sequence for
the originating request. Let ?d =?Alice ↑ C ↓ Bob be the originating request in the
negotiation, and Seq be a safe disclosure sequence for d. When the length of Seq is 1, d
is unlocked at the beginning of the negotiation. Thus when Alice processes the request
?d, the condition in line 5 is satisfied and d is returned for disclosure, which means the
negotiation is successful. Suppose the negotiation is successful when the length of Seq
is k. Consider the case when Seq’s length is k + 1. If d is unlocked, the negotiation is
trivially successful as shown before. Suppose that d is unlocked by U = {d1, . . . , dm},
where each di, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, precedes d in Seq. When Alice receives the request ?d,
she will determine the set of d’s relevant remote disclosures, which is a superset of U .
Assume for the moment that every request ?di Alice sends to another peer is eventually
either granted or denied. In this case, unless Alice has unlocked d already, she will
eventually request all di. Alice’s request for di can be viewed as a sub-negotiation. By
Theorem 1, di has a safe disclosure sequence whose length is at most k, which means
the sub-negotiation for di will succeed, i.e., di will be disclosed to Alice. So unless
Alice has unlocked d already, she will eventually receive all di. Then d is unlocked
and she will disclose it to Bob. By induction, we conclude that the cautious strategy is
complete.
Now we show that every request in the cautious strategy is eventually granted or
denied. Before the negotiation starts, we draw a tree with only its root node N0, and
markN0 as the current node. When Alice receives the originating request ?d0 =?Alice↑
C ↓ Bob, we add an edge from the current node to a new node N1, labeling the edge
as d0. We record the current node as N1. Now Alice must (1) grant d0 (line 14), (2)
deny d0 (line 18), or (3) issue an additional request for a remote relevant disclosure d1
from some peer Carl to unlock d0 (line 19). In the first two cases, we mark the edge
N0N1 between the current node and its parent node as visited, and mark the current
node’s parent N0 as the new current node. Now the current node is the root node, and
all edges of the tree have been visited. Since each ongoing request (one that has been
neither granted or denied) is represented by an unvisited edge, there are now no ongoing
queries in the system. In case (3), we draw an edge from the current node to a new node
N2, label the edge as d1, and mark the current node as N2.
Meanwhile, Carl also has to follow one of the same three cases as Alice. So as the
negotiation evolves, the following invariants are always true: (a) the ongoing requests
correspond to the unvisited edges, which form a path all the way from the current node
to the root node; (b) when the current node is the root node, the originating request has
been granted or denied, there are no ongoing requests in the system, and all messages
have been delivered. Since there are only finitely many peers, each edge is marked with
a disclosure in an ongoing request, and there cannot be two identical ongoing requests
due to the constraints in line 15, we know that the path from the current node to the
root has only a finite number of edges. The number of remote relevant disclosures for
a requested disclosure di is always finite at every peer, which means each node in the
tree can have only finitely many children. Thus the tree we can draw is finite even
in the limit; i.e., every path to the root has a finite length, and each node has only a
finite number of children. This guarantees that the root node will eventually become
the current node. Thus the originating request always gets granted or denied; when it
happens, the MTN terminates.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
To allow trust to be established between more than two parties, we have proposed MTN
as a new approach to distributed authorization. MTN extends and reinvents the core
concepts and theories of ATN, while also addressing the new challenges of coordinat-
ing interleaved communication between parties, detecting circular dependencies, and
providing scalability in a fully decentralized environment. Our solution approach ad-
dresses all key aspects of MTN, including the policy language, negotiation protocols,
and strategies. The DARCL policy language is designed for MTN, yet can also serve as
a general purpose policy language. DARCL policies can base authorization decisions
on credential distributions, allowing the policy writer to specify finer-grained security
constraints than in other policy languages, without loss of flexibility. Our diffusion ne-
gotiation protocol provides a lightweight, effective set of communication conventions
that supports a fully distributed approach to MTN, without relying on trusted third par-
ties to coordinate the negotiation. Our eager and cautious negotiation strategies are safe
and complete, with different tradeoffs between privacy and speed: the eager strategy is
willing to disclose more credentials than the cautious strategy, in order to speed up the
negotiation.
Our solution approach for MTN can be enhanced in a number of aspects. First,
strangers currently need a pre-negotiation stage to reach an agreement on what MTN
negotiation strategy to use, because different MTN negotiation strategies do not interop-
erate with each other. We are interested in finding negotiation strategies that respect the
autonomy of each party while also guaranteeing completeness. Second, if a party sends
a denial message under the cautious strategy, the recipient can guess that the denying
party may not have the requested credential. Li and Winsborough [27, 28] investigated
credential information leakage problems and proposed acknowledgement policies as a
way to prevent unauthorized requesters from guessing sensitive information. One could
extend the acknowledgment policy approach to work with MTN. Third, it would be
interesting to do a performance study regarding the communication complexity, timing
properties, as well as the impact of message loss and dynamic arrival and departures of
the parties. Finally, for particularly sensitive credentials, additional protection could be
provided by extended versions of cryptographic techniques such as hidden policies and
credentials [29, 30], which greatly reduce the risk of interacting with strangers.
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